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The Effects of Financial Support Policies on 
Corporate Decisions by SMEs† 
By CHANGWOO NAM* 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of public credit guarantee 
programs and interest-support programs for SMEs (small and medium 
enterprises). First, assuming that there is an imperfect information 
structure in the SME loan market, we analyze how SME support 
financial programs affect the corporate decisions made by SMEs  
with regard to default or loan sizes. In addition, this paper 
theoretically computes the optimal levels of credit guarantee amounts 
and the interest-support spread under equilibrium with imperfect 
information in a competitive loan market. Second, the paper 
empirically analyzes the continuous policy-treatment effect with the 
GPS (generalized propensity score) method. In particular, we consider 
the ratio of guaranteed debt to the total debt as a continuous policy 
treatment. The empirical results show that marginal effects of a credit 
guarantee on SMEs’ productivity, profitability, and growth potential 
decrease with the ratio of guaranteed debt to the total debt. In addition, 
the average effect of a credit guarantee is maximized when this ratio is 
at 50% to 60%. 
Key Word: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
Information Asymmetry, Loan Market, 
Credit Guarantee, Generalized Propensity Score 
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  I. Introduction 
 
ecently, concerns have been raised that financial support for Korean SMEs 
could delay the restructuring of SMEs and reduce the productivity of the 
Korean economy overall despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of
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Korea guarantees the incubation and training of Korean SMEs. The magnitude of 
public credit guarantees compared to the economy is relatively large as compared 
to that in other OECD countries. In fact, this issue has been constantly raised, but 
studies that develop theoretical models about financial friction in relation to limited 
financing for SMEs are rare. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in their partial equilibrium 
model for the SME loan market show the possibility of the existence of credit 
allocation (credit rationing). However, they do not provide a balanced model of the 
SME lending market which reflects policy effects on production and consumption 
in the economy to provide a basis that can be comprehensively judged by 
policymakers. 
This study seeks to identify the optimal level of SME financing policies by 
simulating how corporate decision-making, including bankruptcy decisions and 
bank interest rate decisions in the lending market, can be affected by government 
finance policies (public credit guarantees and interest support) in the presence of 
information asymmetry (imperfect information) for SMEs, a balanced fiscal policy, 
and the current tax regime. The basic purpose of SME financing policies is to 
alleviate financial friction and information asymmetry in order to realize the 
optimal allocation of resources. However, the existence of information asymmetry 
leads to a fiscal policy under which consumers should pay taxes for SMEs. 
Therefore, the amount of macro-financial assistance is determined at an optimal 
combination of income taxes paid by small businesses and final consumers. 
Moreover, this paper proposes more concrete policy measures to improve the 
credit guarantee policy on the basis of the presented theoretical discussions, in 
particular by analyzing the performances of SMEs. Previous studies focused 
mainly on exposure (or a lack of it) to credit guarantee policies rather than on the 
impact of the degree of exposure to a credit guarantee policy on the performance of 
SMEs. Therefore, this study empirically examines the effect of the ratio of 
guaranteed debt to total debt as a continuous policy treatment on SME performance 
outcomes with the GPS (generalized propensity score) method. 
Briefly, this study finds the following. The equilibrium model based on 
bankruptcy and lending decisions by SMEs shows that the current scale of public 
credit guarantees is higher than the optimal level of policies because the social cost 
is beyond the optimal level. This suggests that the government should consider 
gradually reducing the amount of public credit guarantees to maximize social 
welfare. Second, the performance analysis shows that the marginal effect of credit 
guarantee policies on their ratio of credit-guaranteed debt to total debt is decreasing 
for the SMEs. This suggests that it is necessary to limit the ratio of credit 
guarantees to total debt. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the current status of 
SME financial support programs and compares with other country-specific 
financial support policies in OECD countries. Section III develops the equilibrium 
model and Section IV conducts a social welfare analysis in accordance with a 
counter-factual economic model. Section V analyzes the policy effects of the credit 
guarantee program with firm-level data. Finally, Section VI proposes directions for 
improvement of the financial support programs for SMEs. 
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II. SME Financial Policies 
 
A. Credit Guarantee and Interest Support Programs 
 
A public credit guarantee refers to a type of financial support program for SMEs 
that deficient collateral capacity. It offers a warranty for payment to banks upon the 
bankruptcy or liquidation of the borrowing SME. This program offers a higher 
degree of financial support in terms of the policy scale, and is typical of SME 
financing policies. Regarding the overall amount of Korean public credit guarantee 
funding, KODIT,1 KIBO,2 and KOREG3 recorded a value of 75.5 trillion won at 
the end of 2013, which accounted for 15.4% of all SME loans, i.e., 488.9 trillion 
won. Compared with 2007 before the global financial crisis, the magnitude of 
public credit guarantees has increased by nearly 70%. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. TRENDS OF CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS 
 
TABLE 1—CREDITS FOR INDEMNIFICATION OF KODIT (UNIT: KRW TRILL., %) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Guaranteed Loans 28.5 30.3 39.2 38.7 38.4 39.2 40.6 
Subrogation 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 
(Subrogation Rate) 4.1 4.8 4.7 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.4 
Indemnity 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.3 
Recovered Credits 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 
Recovery Rate 17.2 18.8 23.1 25.8 24.5 23.5 16.6 
Note: we use average amounts per year to compute the subrogation and recovery rates. 
  
 
1Korea Credit Guarantee Fund. 
2Korea Technology Finance Corporation. 
3Korea Federation of Credit Guarantee Foundations. 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
82 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2016 
Credit guarantee institutions subrogate payments of bankrupt SMEs to lenders 
and obtain indemnity from bankrupt SMEs. KODIT (the Korea Credit Guarantee 
Fund) had an average subrogation rate of 4.7% from 2007 to 2013, and its average 
recovery rate of credits for indemnification was 21.3%. However, the average 
recovery rate of commercial banks is approximately 25%, implying that public 
credit guarantee funds may be more benevolent than the private sector. 
An interest-support program means a financial policy that provides SMEs with a 
portion of the loan interest rate when SMEs satisfy certain conditions. The interest-
support program is typically implemented by local governments. For example, the 
Seoul metropolitan government provided SMEs with interest support from 1%p to 
3%p according to CD rates, and most local governments, such as the Busan 
metropolitan government, offer supports ranging from 2%p to 5%p of the interest 
spread when they lend working capital to small businesses. In recent years, the 
fiscal expenditures of the central government for interest-support programs appear 
to be expanding, but it is not clear whether small business loans are actually 
supported. 
In addition, KIBO, as a technology credit bureau, operates an interest-support 
program offering up to 3%p for credit loans issued. In particular, the 2014 budget 
of KIBO for this program was 3.75 billion won, which supported nearly 375 billion 
won of credit loans at an average interest-support spread of 1%p. 
 
B. Policy Comparison with OECD Countries 
 
Given the recent doubts about the economic efficiency of public credit guarantee 
programs, how much the government should provide public credit guarantees is at 
issue. In particular, the amounts of SME loans and the sizes of public credit 
guarantees in OECD countries are very important references in setting policy goals. 
Table 2 shows the proportions of SME loans to all business loans in OECD 
countries. Korean SME loans held a ratio of 74.7% of all business loans in 2012, 
but exceeded 80% of all business loans from 2007 to 2010. SME loans in most 
other countries accounted for no more than 50% of all business loans, except in 
Portugal and Switzerland, which recorded similar levels, at 74.7% and 78.8%, 
respectively, in 2012. 
 
TABLE 2—SME LOANS OVER BUSINESS LOANS OF OECD COUNTRIES (UNIT: %) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Canada 17.4 15.6 17.9 17.5 17.5 15.7 
Chile 16.7 15.2 17.5 18.2 18.2 18.5 
Korea 86.8 82.6 83.5 81.5 77.7 74.7 
Mexico 13.0 12.3 12.0 13.0 13.4 16.1 
Portugal 78.3 77.7 77.4 77.3 77.1 74.7 
Switzerland 81.2 81.1 80.1 79.9 78.8 78.8 
Turkey 40.1 33.8 31.7 35.6 35.7 37.5 
U.K. 19.6 18.0 19.9 21.2 21.2 21.8 
U.S.A 30.1 27.7 27.6 29.0 26.5 23.7 
Note: OECD, Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard.   
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TABLE 3—GUARANTEED LOANS OVER SME LOANS OF OECD COUNTRIES (UNIT: %) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Canada 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Chile 3.0 2.5 6.5 10.2 9.4 15.0 
Finland 3.6 3.7 4.8 5.4 6.3 5.2 
Korea 12.0 11.6 15.2 16.0 15.4 15.4 
Mexico 0.9 1.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.6 
Netherland 1.9 1.9 2.4 5.7 5.4 3.2 
Portugal 0.9 1.7 5.3 7.4 6.9 7.2 
Spain 1.3 2.0 2.2 3.4 4.3 3.4 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Turkey 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
U.K. 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 
U.S.A. 3.0 2.3 2.2 3.4 3.1 3.9 
Note: OECD, Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard. 
 
Table 3 shows the shares of SME loan credit guarantees of SME loans in OECD 
countries. The table also shows that Korea has the highest proportion of public 
credit guarantees of SME loans among OECD countries, followed by Chile, which 
guaranteed 15% of SME loans during the financial crisis. 
However, Portugal and Switzerland recorded SME loans of 7.2% and 0.1%, 
respectively, at the end of 2012, showing relatively low rates compared to Korea. 
In addition, the table confirms that public credit guarantees in developed countries 
such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States do not exceed 5% of 
all SME loans. Additionally, in developed countries, capital market financing is 
more accessible than loan financing to SMEs; therefore, the intervention of those 
governments in the loan markets is less likely to occur than in other countries. 
 
III. Equilibrium in the SME Loan Market 
 
A. Theory of the SME Loan Market with Imperfect Information 
 
It has been a long time since the issue of corporate lending through financial 
intermediation, particularly the SME loan market with information asymmetry, has 
been discussed. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) reviewed the possibility of credit 
rationing as provoked by information asymmetry. Specifically, a single collateral 
rate and a single loan interest rate in the economy were presented in their work and 
demonstrated to distort the supply curve of SME loans through adverse selection, 
with the supply curve not increasing monotonically at a certain level of interest rate 
because SMEs with riskless businesses exit the loan market, whereas SMEs 
running risky businesses stay in the loan market. Eventually banks offer interest 
rates that lead to excess demand such that the credit rationing by the government 
can exist. 
This argument is quite controversial, and the possibility of credit rationing is 
refuted in various papers as a result. Typical papers taking this line include Bester 
(1986) and Arnold and Riley (2009). Bester (1986) argued that credit assignment 
occurred in the economy of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) due to the single-rate loans 
with a single collateral rate. If a bank can offer various sets of collateral rates and 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
84 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2016 
interest rates, the loan market can identify the riskiness of medium and small 
businesses and thus provide several financial products with different collateral rates 
and interest rates. In other words, the bank can offer a wide range of loan products 
with collateral requirements and interest rates and can force companies to reveal 
their degree of riskiness. 
Arnold and Riley (2009) contradict the possible existence of credit rationing 
using the same economic structure in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). They argue that 
credit rationing may occur due to a disconnection in the demand curve rather than 
an issue with the supply curve, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). If the bank revenue 
curve shows a U-shaped line, the optimal curve of the interest rate to maximize a 
bank’s expected return will have a disconnection at a certain point, at which 
demand exceeds supply. However, Arnold and Riley (2009) explain that this is 
likely to arise only when the tail distribution of a low-risk business is extremely 
low. Recently, however, Nam (2013a) demonstrated the possibility of credit 
rationing by calculating invariant measures of SMEs in a repeated game structure 
with bankruptcy decisions. We essentially utilize the economic structure of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). However, there are different assumptions in this paper as 
compared to those in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The government presents a credit 
guarantee ratio for a loan, and banks offer optimal interest rates to SMEs under 
imperfect information. Moreover, SMEs determine loan amounts depending on 
their productivity states, unlike in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Finally, the 
government finances the social cost of credit guarantees by collecting tax on 
consumer deposits. 
Decision-making by firms in the economy is much more complicated than the 
consumer decision-making structure. First, a company should optimize its capital 
and investment amounts depending on the current investment opportunities and 
should determine wage prices and other production factors, including labor. In 
addition, firms should allocate net income optimally into investments and 
dividends according to economic conditions and should determine their use of 
indirect financing or direct financing in their corporate finance strategy. 
A few studies of corporate decisions about investments, dividends and corporate 
finance use the Bellman equation (or dynamic programming). Although many 
recent studies are notable, the present study mainly references Hopenhayn (1992); 
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007); and Arellano, Bai, and Zhang 
(2012). 
Hopenhayn (1992) for the first time showed that there is a general equilibrium 
state in a firm’s entry-exit structure, proving that there is an invariant distribution 
of companies in the market in accordance with the steady-state rates of entry and 
exit. Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007) analyze the social welfare 
effects of changes in credit policies, especially when consumer debt is not fully 
guaranteed. Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2012) demonstrate that the corporate 
development growth rate and the size of indirect financing depend on the degrees 
of financial development and financial friction. However, a firm’s exit value in the 
economy is exogenous, as in Hopenhayn (1992), and a firm automatically exits 
from the market if its operational value is lower than its exit value. 
This paper utilizes the economic structure of Hopenhayn (1992). A firm decides 
to exit the market through bankruptcy, or it can borrow money from a bank, as in 
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Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2012). There are financial friction and an adjustment 
cost of indirect financing. Finally, the present paper calculates the invariant 
distribution of firm bankruptcies with partial government guarantees, as in 
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007). One of the main features in 
this model is that the liquidation value of a SME is determined endogenously such 
that the firm’s entry rate is determined in accordance with its bankruptcy decision. 
This paper refers to many earlier works about such dynamic decision models. 
Zhang (2005); Cooper (2006); Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009); Nikolov and Whited 
(2009); and Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009) are the main references. These all 
posit various dynamic designs of corporate decision models and discuss how they 
are affected by uncertainty in the macro-economy or by idiosyncratic shocks. In 
addition, these corporate decision models analyze the impact of dividends and 
investments on stock prices. In particular, Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) explain 
firm dynamics in terms of dynamic contract theory under information asymmetry. 
However, they do not take into account the distribution of equilibrium among 
firms, and they only focus on the optimal conditions of contract theory. Moreover, 
they do not endogenously address market entry and exit rates. 
The present model is in general new compared to those in earlier works. First, 
capital from the loan market is included as an operating profit function, whereas 
most existing dynamic models separate external financing from production capital. 
Second, our model endogenizes the default decisions of SMEs such that the firm’s 
default value and entry value are endogenously determined by a default decision. 
Third, in our model, the government intervenes in the loan market with financial 
policies such as credit guarantee and interest support programs. Earlier firm 
dynamic models only consider the relationships between firms and financial 
institutions and not policy-intervention efforts by the government. Thus, our model 
is unique in terms of proactive policy intervention in the loan market. 
 
B. SME Dynamic Decision Model 
 
1. Operating Firms’ Decisions  
 
The structure of corporate cash flow is defined as  
 
( 1, , ) ( ) ,k b z z k b      
 
in which   is the operating income function with z  as the exogenous shock 
unknown to the government and banks, as they know only the transition probability 
of z . Moreover, z  is defined as a first-order autoregressive process with i.i.d. 
shock. In this model, z  is the main factor to induce information asymmetry into 
the SME loan market, k  is the capital normalized to one, and b  is the loan size 
that is also the leverage ratio owing to the normalization of capital.   is a 
parameter which denotes the capital share in the operating income function. 
The current operating company, that is, a SME without a credit history of default 
has dynamic decisions defined as 
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        
0 0
0,
1 1
, ,0 max , ,0 | ,
, , 0
, ,0 0, ,1 |
b b
V b z C E V b z z
V b z h max
V b z C E V z z


  
              
 
 
in which h  is defined as the credit history of default, taking a value of one if a 
SME became bankrupt in the last period or zero otherwise. 0C  and 1C  are 
defined as 
        0 1 01 Φ , , 1 .g c zC q r b f c b b b C rc cb             
 
Here, V  is the value of the operating company without a history of default, and 
଴ܸ	is the value of the operating company when it decides not to default and obtain a 
new loan, b , from a bank. 1V  is the firm value of a company that decides to 
declare bankruptcy at the present time. q  and  gr  are defined as the loan interest 
rate and the interest-support spread, respectively. cf  and c  are the credit 
guarantee fee to pay to the government and the coverage ratio of the credit 
guarantee, respectively.   is a parameter pertaining to the time discount 
preference, and rc  is the recovery rate of credit for indemnification after 
subrogation of the government instead of a bankrupt company.    |E z  is the 
expectation operator given .z   ,b b  is defined as the adjustment cost function 
of the loan size, as in the equation 
 
 
2
{ 0}( ', ) ( ', 12
,) b bb b b b

   
 
in which ߛ	 is a parameter linked to the adjustment cost function, which is 
represented as a quadratic function in order to prevent companies from borrowing 
money excessively. Finally,  1   is an indicator function having a value of 1 if the 
statement in { } is true, and 0 otherwise. The symbol ′	over the variables denotes 
the next period. If the firm decides not to declare bankruptcy at the present time, it 
chooses the optimal size of a loan for the next period, ܾᇱ, in 0, ,b    and proceeds 
to the decision of the next period,  , ,0 .V b z   Moreover, if the firm decides to 
declare bankruptcy at the present time, the firm should give any positive operating 
income to the lender and pay the recovery rate multiplied by the guaranteed loan 
size  cb  back to the government, and then move to  0, ,1 .z   
 
2. Bankrupt Firms’ Decisions 
 
A firm with a history of default  1h   has the following decision structure, 
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 (0, ,1) 0 (1 ) (1 ) (0, ,0) (0, ,1' ) | ,'V z E V z V z z         
 
in which   is defined as the probability of business liquidation after bankruptcy, 
and   is exogenously given. The cash flow of a bankrupt firm is zero because it is 
assumed to have ended its operations during its default history.   is defined as 
the probability of bank account suspension of the bankrupt company, which is 1/2. 
In this model, the business liquidation rate and the duration of the default history 
determine endogenously firms’ default rates and entry rates into the market. 
Therefore, if a firm decides to default in the previous period, then in the present 
period, the firm stays in the market without operating income, and the firm will 
close its business in the next period with the probability of ߜ or will stay in the 
market with or without a history of default according to the probability4 of  . 
 
3. Firms’ Invariant Distributions 
 
The state-mapping function is defined according to the state variable vector, 
 , , ,b z h   
  
 
1 0 0
, , 0 1
1 1
if d and h
H b z h if h
if d

    
 
 
 
1 0
 , , 1 1 1
1 1
if d o and h
H b z h if h
if d

 

    
  
 
and the transition function of corporate policy is defined as 
 
(1)              ' '{ }, , 0, 1 , , 0 ( | )z b BG b z h S H b z h f dz z   ∮   
 
(2)       ', , 1, 1 , , 0, 1 ( | )z b BG b z h S H b z h h f dz z    ∮   
or     '01 , , 1, 1 ( | )z b H b z h h f dz z  ∮   
 
 
in which ∮ is the matrix operator, ( | )f    is the transition probability of ,z  and 
S  is defined as the compact space of the state variables. The entry function of 
newborn firms is defined as  
 
 
4The Korea Financial Telecommunications & Clearings Institute (KFTCI) suspends the checking acco
unts of bankrupt companies for investor protection for at least two years. 
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(3)      ' ' '{( , ) 0,0 }, ,1, 1 ,z b hN b z S g dz∮   
 
in which   g   is the probability of ݖ. Finally, we define the transition function of 
firm as 
 
           * , , 1 , ,1, , ,0, 1 , ,1, .G b z S N b z S G b z S G b z S        
 
Additionally, given   ,,c q the distribution of the corporate state-vector 
 , , ,b z h  ,  is defined using the operator Y  as 
 
     *, , ,c qY B Z G b z S d     
 
▏Theorem (Unique Existence of Invariant Measure) 
For any  , ,c q C Q   and for the measurable selection of the 
optimal policy correspondence, the unique and invariant 
distribution    , ,c q M B Z S    satisfies      , , , .c q c q c qY  . 
 
▏Proof 
We use the proof of Theorem 2 in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, 
and Rios-Rull (2007). 
 
Here,   represents the distribution of default decisions as well as the loan sizes 
according to the state variables. Specially,   is defined as banks’ belief function 
with respect to ,d  ,b  and ,z  which are information inaccessible to banks. We 
can then calculate the default probability and the conditional default probability 
 1d   and ( 1| )d b  (Athreya, Tam, and Young 2012). In addition, 
 1d   is the point-mass value because ݀ represents a discrete choice of the 
default decision. 
 
C. Equilibrium Model 
  
1. Bank Interest Rates for Loans 
 
Banks do not know the state of the SME, ,z  but are only aware of the transition 
probability of .z  A SME is assumed to repay the bank loan, ,b  after which it 
will come back to the bank with a new contract, .b  However, the bank does not 
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know the SME’s history, which means that the bank only knows ,b  not .b 5 This 
is the mechanism of information asymmetry. Therefore, if banks have a cumulative 
distribution function of belief    regarding a SMEs’ decision to declare 
bankruptcy, the expected return of b  is then defined as 
 
      , | ,b b b bR c q b b db i b db     
 
in which i  denotes the bank’s financing cost, that is, the interest rate of consumer 
deposits, which is assumed to be exogenously given, and  db  is the probability 
density function with respect to .b  We then define the expected return of b  apart 
from the financing cost as follows: 
     
'
, , ,b b b g
banks contribution rate of credit guarantee fund
R c q r c q fb b   
 
We assume that the loan market is perfectly competitive such that the expected 
profit is defined as 
 
(4)  , | 0,b gr c q b f i     
 
where bq  is the interest rate for .b  Additionally, r  is defined as  
 
(5)       { 0}
   
   
, 1
, | 0, ( 1, | ) ,zb Z b Z
expected profit of non default
expected profit of default
b z
r c q b q d dz b c d dz b
b
 

           
 
 
in which ( 0, | )d dz b   and  ( 1, | )d dz b   are the conditional beliefs in non-
default or default with respect to z  given ,b  and bq  is expressed with (4) and 
(5) in the following form: 
 
(6) 
     0, 1 1, |
( 0 | )
.
z
Z g
b g
b z
i c d dz b f
b
q i f
d b
 

                 
 
The determination of equation (6) is due to information asymmetry, i.e., how 
much the banks believe that the loan (ܾ) which pays interest (ݍ௕) will default. 
Particularly, if banks believe that  1| 0,d b    b gq i f   is obvious.  
 
5The bank actually can review the history of SME loan cases. Our assumption can then be stronger 
than reality but can also be interpreted to be a gadget creating information asymmetry that can be update
d in the model. 
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2. Government’s Balanced Budget 
 
In this paper, the government supports SMEs’ financing operations through a 
public credit guarantee fund and an interest support program, and the government 
finances this from SMEs’ guarantee fees, banks’ contributions, and consumer taxes. 
Thus, the government’s budget constraint is defined as 
 
     
 
1 1|b g g
government expenditure
f r rc c d b b b 
           
    ,c bf c b b       
 
in which   is the tax rate. If the government balances its budget, the tax rate is 
then solved, as follows: 
 
      
1,
1 .bg g c
b
b d b
r rc c f f c
b b
 
         
 
 
It is important to note that	߬ increases with the interest-support spread and the 
ratio of default loans to all loans. The ratio of default loans to all loans is 
determined endogenously by the proposed decision model for firms. The guarantee 
coverage ratio simultaneously affects government expenditures for SME policies 
and government revenue, but it impacts tax rates differently according to the ratio 
of default loans to all loans. In addition,   decreases with the recovery rate of 
default loans, the bank contribution rate, and the credit-guarantee fee rate. 
However, the bank contribution rate can negatively influence the total credit size in 
the economy, and the credit-guarantee fee rate can affect the operating cash flow of 
SMEs such that corporate decisions may be distorted. Moreover, the recovery rate 
can affect the value of a bankrupted company. 
 
3. Consumer Utility Problem 
 
This paper assumes one representative consumer in the economy, with the 
following utility problem: 
 
( , ) max ( ) [ ( , )]. 
C
D B U C E D B       
 
She has a budget constraint for consumption  C  which is defined as 
 
 1 ,C D iB B     
 
in which ,D ,B  and ,B  are the dividend, deposit at the previous time, and new 
deposit for the next period, respectively, in the aggregation such that 
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     , 0 10 1D 1 1 , ,z b d dC C dz db       
   B , .b bb db and B b db        
 
In particular, B  and B  should be equal according to the market clearing 
condition. 
 
4. Bayesian Equilibrium 
 
The Bayesian equilibrium is defined under information asymmetry as in 
Athreya, Tam, and Young (2012). Athreya, Tam, and Young (2012) simultaneously 
analyze equilibrium without information asymmetry, but our study focuses on the 
optimal levels of financial support in equilibrium with imperfect information. 
 
▏Definition (Bayesian Equilibrium) 
The Bayesian equilibrium in the SME loan market consists of (a) a 
SME’s loan *b :S R  and default decision *d :S 0,1,  (b) a 
bank’s loan interest rate  *q : R M 1/ β, q Q,   (c) the 
government’s budget  *τ : R Q 0,1 ,   and  d  given *μ ,  the 
bank’s belief about the SME’s loan and bankrupt decision satisfies 
the following: 
① SME solves the optimization problem of *b  and *d  given 
*
bq .  
②  Banks offer *bq  as a mixed Nash equilibrium under the price 
competition given the SME’s *b  and their belief about default, 
 *μ b .  
③ The government balances the budget by adjusting *τ  given 
*b ,  b∗, *q ,  and *μ .   
④ A consumer chooses *C  and *B  given	b∗,	q∗, μ∗ and τ∗. 
 
D. Assessment of the Equilibrium Model  
  
In this chapter, we define the SME dynamic model, bank interest rate decisions, 
the government’s balanced budget constraint, and the abovementioned consumer’s 
utility problem. However, discussion about the compatibility of the model is 
critical for the interpretation of the policy evaluation. For this reason, we assess the 
equilibrium model and limit the analysis of the effects of SME financial policies 
through a simulation. 
SMEs’ optimal decisions are the most important element in the model. In 
particular, SMEs in the model are assumed to use only loans rather than the capital 
markets. This is reasonable because the majority of SMEs as unlisted companies 
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use indirect financing according to available data. However, while analyzing the 
substitutability of direct financing and indirect financing via the financial markets, 
it becomes necessary to expand our model to the capital markets. Second, in this 
model, we do not take into account the industrial characteristics of SMEs. Our 
model basically assumes that SMEs are only manufacturing companies. 
Third, the model assumes a perfectly competitive market for loans, which is not 
unrealistic. The paper seeks to analyze the interactions between SMEs’ dynamic 
decisions and bank interest rates such that perfect competition is not decisive with 
regard to theoretical results. The fourth important feature of our model is that 
macro-prudential measures such as the capital ratio to risk assets are not regulated 
explicitly because reductions of credit amounts by banks are endogenously 
adjusted through changes in the loan interest rates. 
Fifth, one representative consumer is assumed to own all of the SMEs. However, 
the SMEs’ optimal decisions are determined individually. In other words, the final 
consumer exists only for the social welfare analysis with the economic variables of 
the SMEs, the banks, and the government. Finally, a price structure for the products 
made by the SMEs is not present because the purpose of our study is to analyze 
steady states of firm distributions according to market entry and exit rates rather 
than dynamic transitions of product prices induced by unexpected shocks. 
 
IV. Policy Simulation in the Equilibrium Model 
 
A. Simulation Methodology 
 
1. Computational Methodology 
 
The heterogeneous agent model in a state of Bayesian equilibrium can be 
computed by dynamic programming. Specifically, the discrete decision model 
regarding the bankruptcy decision can be processed by the methodology in Adda  
 
TABLE 4—SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND RESULTS 
 Parameters Values 
ߙ Income share of capital 0.33 
ߚ Annual time discount rate 0.98 
ߛ Adjustment cost  4.0-5.5 
ߜ Liquidation of bankrupt SMEs 70% 
1/ߣ Average duration of default history record 2 
ܿ Average guarantee coverage ratio 90% 
݅ Average gross deposit rate 4.1% 
௖݂ Average credit guarantee fee rate 1.1% 
௚݂ Bank’s contribution rate to credit guarantee fund 0.38% 
ݎܿ Average recovery rate from indemnity 20% 
Leverage ratio Base model (ݎ௚ ∈ [0.000,0.045])               141%~308% 
Leverage ratio KIS DB from FY 2000 to FY 2011 293%~356% 
Subrogation rate Base model (ݎ௚ ∈ [0.000,0.045]) 4.68%~10.6% 
Subrogation rate KODIT from FY 2007 to FY 2013 4.1%~5.0% 
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and Cooper (2003).6 
 
2. Simulation Parameters 
 
Before simulating the model, the outside parameters should be determined given 
the economic context. Table 4 shows the values of the outside parameters. First, we 
use the value from Park (2012), 0.33, as the capital income-share parameter. The 
annual time discount rate is set to 0.98 considering the interest spread and deposit 
rate, and the parameter of adjustment cost function used ranges from 4.0 to 5.5 
such that we have a range of simulation results. The business liquidation rate of 
bankrupt SMEs is 70%, close to the value in Kang (2004), and the average 
coverage ratio is assumed to be 90%. The average deposit rate is the average 
interest rate for new deposits from 2001 to 2013 at BOK ECOS, 4.1%. The average 
credit guarantee fee rate and recovery rate of indemnity are respectively 1.1% and 
20% from Kang (2005). The bank contribution rate to credit guarantee funding 
takes its value from Kang et al. (2014), i.e., 0.38%. The interest-support spread 
ranges from 0.00% to 4.5% at increments of 50bp. We then calculate the average 
leverage ratios and average subrogation rates. 
In Table 4, the leverage ratio of manufacturing SMEs from FY 2000 to FY 2011 
in the KIS database ranges from 293% to 356%. From the simulation, we compute 
the leverage ratio of SMEs as ranging from 141% to 308%. In addition, the KODIT 
subrogation rate from FY 2007 to FY 2013 has a range of 4.1% to 5.0%, and the 
range of the simulation is from 4.68% to 10.6% according to the range of the 
interest-support spread. 
 
B. Equilibrium Simulation Results 
 
1. Consumer Social Welfare in Equilibrium 
 
Figure 2 shows the final tax rate of the consumer according to the coverage ratio 
and interest-support spread under a state of equilibrium. Without the credit 
guarantee and interest support programs, the consumer will have the lowest tax 
rate, SMEs will not pay the guarantee fee, and banks will not contribute to public 
guarantee funds. In addition, the tax rate does not increase monotonically, as it 
shows an  -shaped decline at a coverage ratio of 60%. The growth of 
bankruptcies by SMEs responds non-monotonically to policy variables and the 
expected return curves of banks. 
Figure 3 shows the final consumption at equilibrium according to the coverage 
ratio and the interest-support spread. Surprisingly, consumption is relatively high at 
lower coverage ratios and interest-support spreads. This phenomenon has two 
causes. First, the higher guarantee coverage ratio and interest-support spread imply 
 
 
6Find steps of computation in the appendix. 
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FIGURE 2. CONSUMER’S TAX RATE AT EQUILIBRIUM (UNIT: %) 
 
 
FIGURE 3. CONSUMPTION AT EQUILIBRIUM (UNIT: %) 
 
 
FIGURE 4. PROPORTIONS OF MARGINAL SMES IN  
THE MARKET AT EQUILIBRIUM (UNIT: %) 
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that the consumer pays more tax, causing the social cost to increase. Second, 
marginal SMEs’ exits are delayed due to the credit guarantee and interest support 
programs, after which the overall profitability of the economy declines as the 
proportion of marginal companies in the market increases. In Figure 4, although the 
proportion of operating SMEs with negative profits is close to 7% at equilibrium 
without the credit guarantee and interest support programs, the proportion at 
equilibrium with these programs increases to 9%. Finally, the figure shows that the 
financial policies for SMEs are likely to delay marginal SMEs’ exits and thus lower 
the final consumption rate. Thus, the cost of the risk sharing of SMEs’ bankruptcy 
and the reduced consumption level can lower social welfare overall. 
 
2. Optimal Levels of Financial Support and Social Welfare 
 
Table 5 shows the optimal levels of the coverage ratio and interest-support 
spread according to the recovery rates of indemnity as determined via a 
simulation.7 The optimal levels of the coverage ratio at recovery rates of 20% and 
40% are 8.75% and 16.25%, respectively. It should also be noted that the optimal 
coverage ratio is in fact the proportion of the credit guarantee size out of the overall 
SME loan amounts. The optimal rates of the interest-support spread at recovery 
rates of 20% and 40% are 25bp and 50bp, respectively. Finally, an increase in the 
recovery rate of indemnity can alleviate the government’s budget line such that it 
can then expand credit guarantees and interest-support spreads due to the reduced 
social cost. 
Our equilibrium model takes into account the decision-making activities of 
several economic agents. The coverage ratio of credit guarantees directly 
influences the decisions of firms, banks, and the government, and the interest-
support program directly impacts corporate and governmental decisions, whereas it 
indirectly affects banks’ decisions. However, a clear analysis of the effects of SME 
financial policies on the real economy is not easy to conduct. The present paper can 
only foretell the impacts of financial polices by computing social welfare through 
the distribution of leverage and the default probability via the behavior of 
economic agents. 
In this context, the recovery rate of indemnity critically affects the economy. The 
recovery rate influences the value of bankrupt companies such that a higher 
recovery rate increases the debt burdens of firms. Simultaneously, a higher 
recovery rate of indemnity positively affects social welfare because the social cost 
decreases. Table 6 shows the effect of the increase of the recovery rate on 
consumption, the tax rate, and the default rate. If the recovery rate increases by 
5%p from the base model, consumption increases by 0.95% and the tax rate and the 
default rate decrease by 5.29% and 0.38%, respectively. In addition, when 
consumption increases by 3.50%p, the tax rate and the default rate decrease by 
22.7% and 1.66%, respectively, according to an increase in the recovery rate of 
100%. 
 
7The counterfactual assumptions of recovery rates are 25% and 40%. The rate of 25% is based on the 
recovery rate of commercial banks, and 40% represents an increase in the recovery rate of the baseline by 100%. 
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TABLE 5—OPTIMAL COVERAGE RATIO AND  
INTEREST-SUPPORT SPREAD ACCORDING TO THE RECOVERY RATE 
Recovery rate (rc) Coverage ratio (c) Interest-support spread (rg) 
20% 8.75% 0.25% 
25% 8.75% 0.25% 
40% 16.25% 0.50% 
Note: This table shows average values of results according to	ߛ ranging from 4.0 to 5.5. 
 
TABLE 6—CHANGES IN SOCIAL WELFARE ACCORDING TO  
AN INCREASE IN THE RECOVERY RATE 
From 20% (rc)  Consumption (C) Tax (τ) Default rate 
5%p increase +0.95%  -5.29% -0.38% 
20%p increase +3.50%  -22.7%  -1.66% 
Note: This table shows average values of results according to γ ranging from 4.0 to 5.5. 
 
V. Analysis of the Continuous Treatment Effect for  
Credit Guarantees 
 
In this section, we analyze the effects of a credit guarantee program on 
performance when SMEs are supported by KODIT. In particular, , we use the ratio 
of guaranteed debt to the total debt in a continuous treatment rather than a binary 
treatment effect analysis of the average treatment effect (Hirano and Imbens 2004). 
This analysis of the continuous treatment effect can determine the marginal effect 
of policy variables instead of the average effect of exposure to a policy. Moreover, 
most Korean policy-research papers analyze only the average treatment effect; 
hence, the present analysis of the continuous treatment effect contributes to the 
research on SME financial policies in an important way. 
 
A. Methodology of the Analysis of the Continuous Treatment Effect  
 
1. Generalized Propensity Score Method 
 
Our analysis is based on the GPS (generalized propensity score) method of 
Hirano and Imbens (2004). The generalized propensity score removes the 
endogeneity of selection bias by controlling the propensity to be selected through 
the characteristics of objects as the generalization of the propensity score for a 
binary treatment effect. Hirano and Imbens (2004) assume unconfoundness when 
controlling this endogeneity such that for any treatment  0,1 ,t   | ,Y t T X  is 
satisfied.  Y t  denotes the performance of the treatment variable   ,t  T represents 
the continuous treatment, ܺ is the pre-treatment variable in each case, properly 
defined based on the probability measure. This assumption means that the 
treatment characteristics are independent of the performance. Another assumption 
is a balancing property such that 
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   1 | , ,X T t t x   
 
in which  ,t x  is | ( | ),T Xf t x  the conditional probability of the treatment 
derived characteristics. 
Hirano and Imbens (2004) prove using these assumptions that 
 
     ( | , , ) ( | , andT Tf t t X Y t f t t X   
       , , , .t r E Y t t X E Y T t R           
 
The last equation is     , , ,t E t t X      representing the expected 
performance according to continuous treatment and the generalized propensity 
score. 
In more detail, regarding the given characteristics ,iX  we assume that  2( ) | ( , ),i i ig T X h XN   . Subsequently, from 
 
      22 ˆˆ 1 1 , ,22i i iR exp g T h X        
 
we can estimate the GPS by means of maximum likelihood estimation. 
Next, we estimate the expected performance using quadratic regression with 
estimated GPS and continuous treatment variable such that  
 
    2 20 1 2 3 4 5| , , ; .i i i i i i i i i i iE Y T R T R T T R R T R               
 
Finally, we calculate the average performance according to each treatment level 
with the expected performance such that 
 
    
1
1 , .ˆ ˆ ˆ;
N
i i
i
E Y t T R
N
 

   
 
2. Data for the Empirical Analysis 
 
The data used here are the loan guarantees of KODIT from FY 2008 to FY 2011. 
We merged the KODIT data and the KIS database for the SME performance 
measures. The average coverage ratio for a loan is 92.9%, and most loan 
guarantees have coverage ratios of 85%, 90%, 95%, and 100%. It should also be 
noted that most coverage ratios are high and inflexible considering the SMEs’ 
characteristics. 
We compute the ratio of guaranteed debt to total debt for each SME in the 
KODIT data as the continuous treatment effect. If the maturity of the guarantee is 
longer than one year, we cover that loan for longer than one year, and if one SME  
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FIGURE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF COVERAGE RATIOS FOR SME LOANS 
Data: Loan cases of KODIT from FY 2008 to FY 2011. 
 
has several credit guarantees for loans, we compute the ratio of guaranteed debt to 
total debt by adjusting the data according to the maturities of the guarantees. 
The log values of total assets, debt to assets, ROA, trade payables to sales, and 
the financial cost to the total cost are used as the SMEs’ pre-treatment variables (or 
characteristics), from Nam (2013b). Additionally, the interest expense with regard 
to the total debt and the log values of sales are used to control the interest cost 
according to the change in the credit amount and the operating performance values, 
respectively. 
When dealing with raw data, we need to adjust the time lag between the pre-
treatment variables (firm characteristics) and the performance measures. First, 
every variable is computed as of the end of the fiscal year. If a credit guarantee was 
approved before the end of June in year ,t  then both the pre-treatment variables at 
year 1t   and the performance measures at year ݐ are considered in the same 
observation. If the time of approval of the credit guarantee was after the end of 
June in year ,t  then the pre-treatment variables at year ,t  and performance 
measures at year 1t   are considered in the same observation. Thus, guaranteed 
debt which started in March of 2008 is grouped with the pre-treatment variables of 
2007, but not with the pre-treatment variables of 2008, implying that KODIT’s 
decisions on credit guarantees made before July are assumed to include only the 
information up to the previous year, whereas decisions after June are assumed 
partially to use the information of the same year. In addition, if one firm has several 
guarantees during the same year, we compute the observation as of the latest time 
because the first decision among the guarantees is assumed to have used the most 
crucial information. 
 
  
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 38 NO. 3       The Effects of Financial Support Policies on Corporate Decisions by SMEs  99 
B. Results of the Continuous Treatment Analysis 
 
1. Basic Statistics 
 
The number of firm-year observations computed through the method explained 
in the previous section is 38,370, but most SMEs in the data are not externally 
audited. Therefore, the data are less reliable given this information and the great 
number of outliers. Thus, we randomly sample 3,000 observations.8 
Table 7 shows the statistics of the randomly sampled data used here. The mean, 
median, and standard deviation of the continuous treated guaranteed debt over the 
total debt are 39.3%, 28.3%, 32.5%, respectively. However, the proportion of 
examples with a 100% guarantee for all debt amounts to 12%, indicating that all of 
the debt of some SMEs is completely covered by credit guarantees. Thus, these 
SMEs may be considered to have excessive financial support from the government. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF THE RATIO OF GUARANTEED DEBT TO TOTAL DEBT 
Data: KODIT’s loan data (FY 2008~FY 2011), KIS Database. 
 
TABLE 7— BASIC STATISTICS OF PRE-TREATMENTS AND PERFORMANCES 
Variables Mean Median S.D. 
Guaranteed debt/total debt 39.3% 28.3% 32.5% 
Log (assets) 14.3 14.4 1.39 
Log (sales) 15.0 15.0 1.36 
Total debt/assets 34.8% 35.8% 26.1% 
ROA 6.62% 9.96% 80.4% 
Trade payables/sales 4.09% 6.57% 9.04% 
Financial cost/total cost 0.98% 1.91% 3.62% 
Interest cost/total debt 5.96% 7.04% 7.58% 
Data: KODIT’s loan data (FY 2008~FY 2011), KIS database. 
 
8As a pre-analysis, the main features of the empirical results with all observations are consistent wit
h those of the randomly sampled observations. 
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TABLE 8—COEFFICIENTS OF GPS FOR GUARANTEED DEBT TO TOTAL DEBT 
Variables Coefficients t-values 
Log (sales) 0.03 1.04 
Log (assets) -0.41 -12.9 
Total debt/assets -0.02 -15.8 
ROA -0.01 -5.67 
Trade payables/sales 0.000 0.01 
Financial cost/total cost 0.001 0.15 
Interest cost/total debt 0.002 0.89 
 
According to Table 8, the log (assets), total debt/assets, and ROA significantly 
influence the GPS function. 
 
2. Analysis Results 
 
Table 8 shows the GPS coefficients for the continuous treatment log-normalized, 
ratio of guaranteed debt to total debt using the method of Hirano and Imbens 
(2004). The log values of sales, the total debt to assets, and the ROA are negatively 
and significantly correlated with the continuous treatment, indicating that as a firm 
is smaller, has less debt, and is less profitable, it can have relatively more 
guarantees.  
Table 9 shows the statistics of firms’ financial ratios as continuous treatment 
performance measures. Recently, the means of the growth rates of net income and 
capital have been negative due to poor operating conditions and low profitability, 
but the medians stand at 14.9% and 19.4%, respectively. Although most studies 
commonly use the growth rate of assets or sales as performance measures, these 
variables are not completely free from endogeneity because the growth of assets 
must be correlated with an increase in debt by credit guarantees and the approval of 
a credit guarantee may be due to a new contract promising massive sales. 
Therefore, we only use the value-added to capital and the value-added to sales as 
performance measures of SME productivity and use the growth rates of net income 
and capital to represent profitability and growth potential. 
Figures 7-10 show the continuous treatment effects and the percentage ratio of 
guaranteed debt to all debt on firms’ performances. Specifically, the upper panel in 
the figure shows the marginal effect of a 1%p increment in treatment, and the lower 
panel shows the level effect of the treatment. 
Figure 7 shows the effect of the treatment on the percentage ratio of value-added 
to capital. The upper panel shows that the marginal effect of the policy treatment is 
highest from 15% to 20%, and the marginal effect decreases with doses of the  
 
TABLE 9—BASIC STATISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Variables Mean Median S.D. 
Value-added/capital 68.6% 43.9% 85.7% 
Value-added/sales 28.1% 24.3% 25.6% 
Growth of net income -36.2% 14.9% 3,566% 
Growth of capital -8.53% 19.4% 3,994% 
Data: KIS Database. 
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treatment such that the response function peaks at a guaranteed debt to total debt 
ratio of 65%. 
Figure 8 shows that the marginal effect of the treatment on value-added to assets 
is highest at around 15% and that the performance of the treatment peaks at 65%. 
Figure 13 shows the similarity of the effect of net income growth with the results 
presented in Figure 12. Particularly, the marginal effect of this treatment becomes 
more significance as the treatment increases. 
Figure 9 shows a similar pattern in that the marginal effect is higher at lower 
treatment values, and the response has its greatest effect in the middle of the 
treatment. Figure 10 shows the effect of the treatment on capital growth. The 
marginal effect decreases with the treatment and negatively affects capital growth 
when the ratio of guaranteed debt to all debt exceeds 65%. 
According to the empirical results, the public guarantee program has a positive 
impact on a firm’s performance when the firm’s total debt is less covered by such a 
guarantee program. However, as coverage by the guarantee program for a firm’s   
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7—DOSE FUNCTION AND RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR  
VALUE-ADDED TO CAPITAL 
Note: The horizon axis denotes guaranteed debt to total debt (%), and the vertical axis is 
performance measure (%). The upper panel shows the dose effect for a 1%p increment of the 
treatment, and the lower panel shows the response of the performance measure to the treatment. 
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FIGURE 8. DOSE FUNCTION AND RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR  
VALUE-ADDED TO SALES  
Note: The horizon axis denotes guaranteed debt to total debt (%), and the vertical axis is 
performance measure (%). The upper panel shows the dose effect for a 1%p increment of the 
treatment, and the lower panel shows the response of the performance measure to the treatment. 
 
 
FIGURE 9. DOSE FUNCTION AND RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR  
NET INCOME GROWTH 
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FIGURE 9. DOSE FUNCTION AND RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR  
NET INCOME GROWTH (CONTINUED) 
Note: The horizon axis represents the guaranteed debt to total debt (%), and the vertical axis is the 
performance measure (%). The upper panel shows the dose effect for a 1%p increment of the 
treatment, and the lower panel shows the response of the performance measure to the treatment. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10. DOSE FUNCTION AND RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR CAPITAL GROWTH 
Note: The horizon axis denotes the guaranteed debt to total debt (%), and the vertical axis is the 
performance measure (%). The upper panel shows the dose effect for a 1%p increment of the 
treatment, and the lower panel shows the response of the performance measure to the treatment. 
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total debt increases, the firm faces a moral hazard because the burden of all debt 
can be avoided by the credit guarantee. Therefore, the excessive supply of public 
guarantees for SMEs while not considering the efficient allocation of public 
resources may negatively influence economic performance overall given the 
prevalence of moral hazard on the part of the borrower. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates how financial support schemes such as credit guarantee 
and interest support programs for SMEs dynamically affect corporate decisions, 
including default decisions, in an equilibrium model with information asymmetry. 
Particularly, we calculate the optimal sizes of the credit guarantee and interest-
support spread in a perfectly competitive loan market with imperfect information 
for SMEs. The simulation results show that the current levels of the credit 
guarantee size and interest-support spread may be excessive, thus above the 
optimal levels. 
Second, our study empirically analyzes the effects of credit guarantee programs 
using the ratio of guaranteed debt to total debt as a continuous treatment variable 
with the GPS method. According to the results, the marginal effects of credit 
guarantees of productivity, profitability and growth potential decrease with the 
ratio of guaranteed loans to total debt. In addition, the response functions for a 
credit guarantee peaks between 50% and 60%. 
Finally, this paper proposes several policy improvements for the credit guarantee 
programs. First, the government needs to lower the amount of total credit 
guarantees with reference to all SME loans because the proportion of the public 
credit guarantee to all SME loans at Korea is higher than those in other OECD 
countries, and theoretical simulations show that consumers pay more tax than the 
optimal level of social welfare. Moreover, it is possible that the excessive financial 
support for SMEs hampers prudential firm dynamics, including productivity and 
investment, by delaying the exit of poor SMEs from the market. 
Second, an increase in the SME guarantee fee or bank contribution rate is more 
likely to boost the default rate or loan interest rate such that any positive effects of 
the SME financial support may be weakened. Thus, the government needs to 
strengthen regulations pertaining to recovery for indemnity from bankrupt 
companies, which would distort the default rate and loan interest rate less. Despite 
the limitations of our model, it was found that an increase in the recovery rate of 
100% can reduce the consumer tax burden by 22.7%. Additionally, strong policies 
for collecting debt from bankrupt SMEs can prevent moral hazard. 
Lastly, current regulations which control the amount of credit guarantees per 
firm do not limit the proportion of credit guarantees to a firm's total debt. 
Therefore, the government must regulate the limit on the ratio of guaranteed debt to 
overall debt and must flexibly manage the coverage ratio for each loan application 
in order to prevent the negative effects of the credit guarantee program. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Computation of transition probability of z  
 
In order to compute ,z  we define the return on assets such that 
 
  11 ,ROA z b    
 
and if the leverage is defined as ,b  then 
 
  11
ROA z
b 
  
 
can be computed. First, we compute z  with data from FY 2000 to FY 2011 from 
the KIS database, categorizing 25 ranges of .z  Finally, the transition probability 
of z  is computed with a matrix of	ݖ 25 25  in size. This method is analogous to 
the approach taken by Adda and Cooper (2003). 
 
2. Computation of the dynamic model 
 
We compute the upper limit of ܾ, തܾ, such that  
 
 1
.
1
z b
b
q
   
 
1. Compute  TV b,z  by the backward induction of dynamic programming 
given 0q .   
 
2. Compute  T 1 V b,z  with  0,T 1V b,z  and  1,T 1 V b,z  after computing  
 TE[V b ]  using the transition matrix of z.  
 
3.  Repeat step 2 until  V b,z  converges with some extent to precision. 
 
4. Through steps 2 and 3, find the firm’s optimal policy given  b,z  and then 
compute  μ b,z .  
 
5. Compute 1q  with μ.  
 
6. Repeat from step 1 to step 5 until q  is converged with some extent to 
precision. 
 
7. Compute *,B  * ,  and *C  with *  and *q  in step 6. 
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